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1. Why were you initially drawn to the theory of signs and meaning? 
 
My dissertation, completed in 1976, is entitled: The Ontology of Reference. Studies in Logic and 
Formal Ontology. It is a study of theories of meaning and reference in Frege, Husserl and 
Michael Dummett. I had earlier attended many classes given by Dummett, during my time 
(1970-73) as an undergraduate in Oxford. I had been tremendously impressed by Dummett’s 
passion for philosophy; but also dissatisfied with the sorts of answers to philosophical questions 
which he (channeling Frege) was proposing. I thus became interested in exploring alternatives 
to Frege-inspired approaches to philosophy, which seemed to me to rest on an oversimplified 
repertoire of ontological categories.1 I very quickly became convinced that Husserl, and 
especially the sort of ontological thinking set forth by Husserl in the Logical Investigations, 
provided the key to what I was looking for. The Ontology of Reference embodies my early 
attempts to solidify this conviction, using Dummett and Frege as foils.2 
 
I spent the next 20 years or so exploring the thought of Husserl, of his teacher Brentano, and of 
his great students Roman Ingarden and Adolf Reinach, with almost exclusive attention to 
themes in ontology (including the ontology of works of art, and of speech acts). I collaborated 
throughout this period with Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, with whom I still share many 
views on the nature of philosophy and on its current state.3 
 
2. What do you consider your contribution to the field? 
 
I have since been working primarily on applying ontology in a variety of extraphilosophical 
areas, above all biomedicine. In 2002, drawing on Husserl’s coinage of the term ‘formal 
ontology’ and on a generous award by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, I established in 
Germany the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science.4 I have since then 
been in the peculiar position of having witnessed how what had initially seemed a private 
concern of Mulligan, Simons and myself, namely applied ontology – (roughly) the application to 
real-world problems of ontological tools and theories deriving from philosophy – has burgeoned 
into a veritable industry, in which philosophical work overlaps with computer science, database 
engineering, and scientific research. Representatives of all of these disciplines are attempting to 
solve the problem of how, in an era of information-based science, it might be possible to make 
different sorts of scientific information work well together even though it is collected at different 
times and places, by different researchers using different vocabularies.  
 
There are theoretical (logical, computational, linguistic, but also philosophical) problems to be 
addressed here; but also, perhaps most importantly, there are non-trivial socio-cultural problems 
of coordination, in the addressing of which I have also become heavily involved.5 In addressing 
these multiple sets of problems each disciplinary community has, it seems, contributed its own 
confusions. I believe that my main contribution is (1) to have persuaded at least some of those 
working in the field that some of the repeating elements in these confusions are philosophical in 
nature; and (2) to have demonstrated that resolving these confusions in part by using 
recognizably philosophical methods and theories, may bring positive practical benefits.6  
 
One interesting feature here is that some of the most influential ways people go wrong – for 
example in the use of circular definitions – are resolved already in beginning courses in logic. 
Another significant contribution, therefore, has been a series of attempts on my part to convey 
to working biologists some of the lessons of introductory logic. The paper on the logic of 
relations7 which grew out of this work has been downloaded some 25,000 times, and it has 
been cited in over 200 other papers published in biology and biomedical informatics journals. 
The Gene Ontology, thus far the world’s most successful ontology, has been especially 
influenced by my efforts on this front, in ways which its developers see as bringing genuine 
benefits to its users. 
 
3. What is the proper role of a theory of signs and meaning in relation to other academic 
disciplines? 
 
One important contribution which those working on meanings and signs might make for the 
future is to clarify the thinking of those – a multidisciplinary community predestined to play an 
increasingly influential role in our lives – who are engaged in what is various called ‘information 
modeling’, ‘conceptual representation’, ‘knowledge modeling’ and so forth.  
 
Here what we might call the UM axiom (for ‘Use-Mention Confusion’) is especially important: 
 
UM: Terms (and other units of representation, for example in computers) should be 
distinguished strictly from the objects they represent in reality.8 
 
All those involved in addressing the increasingly urgent need for theoretically well-founded 
methods and resources to manage the burgeoning wealth of information brought by the use of 
computers in science should be thoroughly apprised of this axiom at least several times a day. 
They should be reminded, for example, that an entity in reality is not identical to a website 
describing this entity, and that neither are identical to the website’s URL. 
 
4. and 5. What do you consider the most important topics and/or contributions in the 
theory of meaning and signs? What are the most important open problems in this field 
and what are the prospects for progress? 
 
As someone trained as a philosopher ontologist, I was at first completely at sea in my attempts 
to understand the odd statements made by many of those developing or using ontology-like 
artifacts in the information technology field. I have become especially involved in trying to 
understand how ontologies are being used in healthcare information technology, for example in 
fostering a more coherent treatment of patient data in electronic health records.9,10 The more I 
looked into the way such data is treated at the moment, the more I was confronted with the (to 
me obvious) confusions in the theory of signs, meanings and objects referred to already 
above.11 
 
Notorious examples of such confusions are to be found in the relevant ISO (International 
Organization for Standardization) standards in health informatics, where the ideas of a certain 
Eugen Wüster, a Viennese semiotician/philosopher/terminologist/businessman and professor of 
woodworking machinery, have been extraordinarily influential.12 From Wüster’s point of view, 
through the sensations with which we are bombarded in the initial stages of our life, we begin to 
acquire what Wüster calls “concepts”. Before we can assign a term to such a concept, Wüster 
says, we must first “delineate” the concept by listing ‘the totality of “characteristics” which form 
the concept’s content or intension.’ Sometimes, Wüster suggests that such characteristics are 
themselves just further concepts (so that, like other concepts, they would exist in the heads of 
people). At other times he suggests that they are properties of objects existing in the world. But 
when faced with the problem of defining clearly whether characteristics refer to concepts in the 
head or to properties of objects in the world, the response of Wüster and his epigones is to 
assert, in effect, that there is no difference between the two. This is in keeping with a general 
failure to discriminate clearly between objects and concepts which runs through terminology 
work that has been influenced by Wüster’s thinking (counterparts of which I find also in some 
other types of semiotic thinking, in some work in cognitive linguistics, and in almost all work on 
so-called ‘conceptual modeling’). 
 
The influence of this failure is illustrated most clearly, and perhaps most tragically, in the work of 
HL7 (for “Health Level 7”), a large and influential body, comprising representatives of different 
parts of the health care information technology industry in some 66 countries. HL7’s pride and 
joy is its ‘Reference Information Model’ (or RIM), an artifact which has, strangely, been elevated 
to the status of an ISO standard. Central to the RIM is the concept ‘Act’, which is defined as 
meaning:  
 
A record of something that is being done, has been done, can be done, or is intended or 
requested to be done. 
 
An Act, then, is something like: the record of an act. The term ‘Act’, for the RIM, embraces: 
assessments of health conditions (such as problems and diagnoses), healthcare goals, and 
observations. An observation is defined, in its turn, as: 
 
An Act of recognizing and noting information about the subject, and whose immediate 
and primary outcome (post-condition) is new data about a subject.  
 
As is I hope already clear, the HL7 documentation conveys a certain uncertainty as to whether 
an Act should most properly be conceived as a record of something that is being done, etc., or 
as the act of doing that is recorded. Both views are represented prominently in different places 
in the RIM documentation, and efforts have been made in various circles to resolve the 
contradiction between the two. The HL7 organization, one might think, would by now, after more 
than 10 years of RIM development, have resolved this contradiction through some official diktat 
as to which of these two evidently conflicting interpretations is correct. Incredibly, however, they 
resolve the issue with the following declaration (English and punctuation as in the original): 
 
Act as statements or speech-acts are the only representation of real world facts or 
processes in the HL7 RIM. The truth about the real world is constructed through a 
combination (and arbitration) of such attributed statements only, and there is no class in 
the RIM whose objects represent “objective state of affairs” or “real processes” 
independent from attributed statements. As such, there is no distinction between an 
activity and its documentation.13  
 
The solution to the logical contradiction between ‘An Act is a record’ and ‘An Act is an action in 
the world’ is to deny that these two statements are in logical conflict – because an activity and 
the record of an activity are one and the same.14 
 
In the specific field of biomedical informatics, and biomedical ontologies, there are some signs 
of progress. Some ontology developers, for example, are beginning to learn that when they use 
a word like ‘kidney’ in an ontology, then this word should not be interpreted as referring to some 
representation in a computer, or to some concept in someone’s head, but rather to an entity on 
the side of reality. This leads to another central axiom for ontology developers, which we might 
call TC, or: the axiom of terminological coherence: 
 
TC: For any expression ‘E’ in an ontology, ‘E’ means E. 
 
I am sometimes asked what might be the pragmatic consequences of ontology developers 
getting this thing right or wrong. The answer to this challenge can again most easily be 
illustrated by the case of HL7. First, the consequences of multiple, cascading violations of UM 
and TC are that the documentation guiding successive cohorts of users of HL7 artifacts is (as 
the HL7 organization has recently been forced to admit15) often painfully unintelligible. HL7 
initiates themselves have thereby become involved in interminable disputes, documented for all 
to see in HL7’s public email fora. Another is that multi-million-dollar projects fail,16 leading, I 
believe, to the entrenchment of what thereby begins to appear to be a well-justified pessimism 
as to the very viability of information technology in the domain of healthcare. 
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